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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #8002-80  
10 December 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment

FROM : Robert M. Gates  
National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

SUBJECT : NFIB Reps Meeting on Poland

1. I convened the NFIB Reps this morning to review events in Poland and the estimates each intelligence organization is providing to its Principals. I set forth the two hypotheses being carried in CIA's analysis -- first that the Soviets have positioned their forces to intimidate the Poles and do not now plan to move their forces into Poland and second that the Soviets are ready to intervene in Poland and are likely to do so in the relatively near future. The agencies lined up as follows on the hypotheses:

- CIA, DIA and to a lesser extent the Marine Corps accept hypothesis number ~~one~~ <sup>two</sup> and consider the period December 11 through 16 to be a critical time.
- INR, NSA, Air Force, Army, and Navy all believe hypothesis number ~~two~~ <sup>one</sup> is more likely; that is, they do not believe the Soviets intend to go into Poland at this time particularly in the absence of a larger provocation. These agencies generally agree that more preparations, particularly of a logistical nature, are required in order to have a force as large as the Soviets would like ready to go into Poland. (S)

2. I should note that there are divisions within all the agencies particularly among individuals. (C)

3. Two additional hypotheses were raised in the meeting for what is happening in Poland. Under the first, offered by INR,

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4. An additional hypothesis, also put forward by INR, is that the Soviets have not made a political case to their own people or to the Warsaw Pact Allies sufficient to support their fighting their way into Poland. Under this hypothesis the Poles probably were asked to let their Allies enter the country in the form of an exercise. They demurred, indicating that they preferred to handle the situation on their own. The Warsaw Pact Summit was then convened which ended up giving Kania somewhat more time, although he is on probation. As part of this hypothesis, INR notes that before the Summit the Polish army had indicated fairly consistently that it would not become involved in politics. An important change has been that following the Summit the army has indicated that it would in fact take a role and set limits to the activities that could be permitted in Poland by Solidarity and other such forces. In short, the army has pledged to live up to its Warsaw Pact commitments but also that they will handle the internal situation in Poland themselves before permitting the Allies to come in. There was considerable dispute in the meeting regarding both of these additional hypotheses. (S)

5. All were agreed that the period from Thursday through Tuesday would be a vitally important one to watch. We have scheduled another meeting for 17 December either to begin addressing the consequences of a Soviet intervention or a post-mortem about why they did not go in and what will happen next. (S)

  
Robert M. Gates

cc: Chairman, NIC

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